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Abstract—In many smart infrastructure applications, flexibility
in achieving sustainability goals can be gained by engaging end-
users. However, these users often have heterogeneous preferences
that are unknown to the decision-maker tasked with improving
operational efficiency. Modeling user interaction as a continuous
game between non–cooperative players, we propose a robust
parametric utility learning framework that employs constrained
feasible generalized least squares estimation with heteroskedastic
inference. To improve forecasting performance, we extend the
robust utility learning scheme by employing bootstrapping with
bagging, bumping, and gradient boosting ensemble methods.
Moreover, we estimate the noise covariance which provides
approximated correlations between players which we leverage
to develop a novel correlated utility learning framework. We
apply the proposed methods both to a toy example arising
from Bertrand-Nash competition between two firms as well as
to data from a social game experiment designed to encourage
energy efficient behavior amongst smart building occupants.
Using occupant voting data for shared resources such as lighting,
we simulate the game defined by the estimated utility functions
to demonstrate the performance of the proposed methods.
Index Terms—Game Theory, Inverse Optimization, Smart
Building Energy Efficiency
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to pervasive utilization of Internet of Things and Cyber-
Physical Systems sensing/actuating platforms, we are increas-
ingly observing human decision-makers being integrated into
operational and managerial decisions in infrastructure systems.
Their actions can be leveraged to increase both resilience and
sustainability thereby making smart infrastructure a worth-
while investment. Smart buildings, being no exception, are
a fundamental component of emerging smart cities; their
efficient design and operation enables flexibility—e.g., by au-
tomatically shifting or curtailing demand during peak hours—
in making urban spaces sustainable. More abstractly, in many
infrastructure systems there is often an entity acting as a
planner (e.g., facility managers, departments of transportation,
etc.) that introduces incentives or control policies to coordinate
autonomously acting agents in the system (e.g., selfish human
decision-makers) so that their collective behavior leads to
system-level efficiency gains.
One approach to designing such policies is to leverage
game-theoretic models of decision-making in an optimization
framework to produce policies that encourage or induce be-
havior that optimizes an objective [1], [2]. Often the planner
has at best a prior on the decision-making model of the
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individual agents. Such information asymmetries lead to inef-
ficiencies [1], [3]. In this paper, we propose a framework for
estimating decision-making models of self-interested decision-
makers consuming a shared resource (e.g., lighting in a smart
building) that can be leveraged in control or incentive design
to aid in closing the efficiency gap.
To concretize ideas, consider a smart building—an example
we will return to throughout the text. A facilities manager
may be incentivized or even tasked to encourage energy
efficient behavior if they are accountable for energy costs
or are required, e.g., to maintain an operational excellence
measure (see, e.g., [4], [5]). At the same time, the facili-
ties manager generally must also ensure user comfort and
productivity [6]. Beyond these motivations, demand response
(DR) programs are being rolled out by utility companies and
third-party solution providers with the goal of correcting for
improper load forecasting. Participating consumers decide to
change their consumption when DR events are called [7]. The
facilities manager may be required to keep this schedule.
Smart building technologies enable new avenues for fa-
cilities managers to keep such a prescribed schedule via
automation or integrating the end-user. Yet, in office buildings
the occupants, as employees, typically are not responsible
for paying for the energy resources they consume. Hence,
there is often a misalignment between the incentives of the
facilities manager and the occupants. Social games are a means
to engage the occupants to address these inefficiencies. In
Section VI, we describe one such social game that we designed
and implemented on the UC Berkeley campus, aimed at
incentivizing energy efficient consumption of shared resources
by leveraging building automation.
The broader purpose of this paper is to present a general
framework that leverages game-theoretic concepts to learn
models of players’ decision-making in competitive environ-
ments such as the building energy social game described
above. The framework supports learning agents’ preferences
over shared resources as well as understanding how pref-
erences change as a function of external stimuli such as
physical control or incentives. Such a framework can be used
in the design of incentive mechanisms that realign agents’
preferences with those of the planner—which often represent
system-level performance criteria—through fair compensation.
More concretely, we model decision-making agents as utility
maximizers and, using inverse optimization and game-theoretic
techniques, we derive a robust scheme to infer their utility
functions. At the core of our approach is the fact that we
model the agents as non-cooperative players in a game playing
according to a Nash equilibrium strategy. From this point of
view, agents are strategic entities that make decisions based
on their own preferences despite others. The game-theoretic
framework both allows for qualitative insights to be made
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about the outcome of such selfish behavior—more so than
a simple prescriptive model—and, more importantly, can be
leveraged in designing mechanisms for incentivizing agents.
We assume a parametric form of utility function for each
player that is dependent on the decisions of others. Corre-
lations between players’ decisions are not known a priori.
Assuming observations are approximately Nash equilibria,
we use first– and second–order conditions on player util-
ity functions to construct a constrained regression model.
The result is as a constrained Generalized Least Squares
(cGLS) problem with non-spherical noise error terms. Using
constrained Feasible Generalized Least Squares (cFGLS), an
implementable version of cGLS, we utilize heteroskedastic
inference to approximate the correlated errors.
Noting that data sets of observed decisions often may be
small relative to the number of model parameters in practice,
we employ bootstrapping to generate pseudo-data from which
we learn additional estimators. The bootstrapping process al-
lows us to derive an asymptotic approximation of the bias and
standard error of an estimator. We utilize ensemble methods
such as bagging, bumping, and gradient boosting to extract
an estimator from the pseudo-data generated estimators that
results in a reduced forecasting error. The ensemble methods
are robust under noise and autocorrelated error terms. We
apply the robust utility learning framework to a model of
Bertrand-Nash competition between firms in order to illustrate
the framework and its performance.
Building on the robust utility learning framework, we use
the approximated standard error to derive an innovative utility
learning method in which we modify players’ utility functions
to create a correlated game. The resulting correlated utility
learning method leverages correlations between players and
the ensemble estimators to minimize the estimation error by
optimizing scaling coefficients that appear in the correlated
game utility functions. Applying this method results in a
significant improvement over the constrained Ordinary Least
Squares (cOLS) estimations and outperforms many of the
ensemble methods. It also provides insights into how players
interact with one another and indicates which players are
potentially forming coalitions. Moreover, this technique is
amenable to online implementation after an initial training pe-
riod so that by using cOLS estimators in the correlated utility
learning framework, our adaptive incentive design schemes,
introduced in [3], [8], can be made robust.
To demonstrate the efficacy of both the robust and correlated
utility learning frameworks, we apply them to data generated
from the smart building social game experiment we conducted.
We show that estimating the players’ utility functions via the
proposed methods results in a predictive model that outper-
forms several other standard techniques such as Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
the abstracted game framework for modeling the interaction of
agents as well as define equilibrium concepts in Section II. In
Section III, we formulate the robust utility learning framework
and provide an algorithm for implementing it. Section IV con-
tains the Bertrand-Nash competition example and we present
the correlated utility learning framework in Section V. In
Section VI, we describe the social game experimental setup on
the UC Berkeley campus within the CREST center1, provide a
brief literature review, and present the results of both proposed
utility learning methods applied to data from the social game.
We make concluding remarks and discuss future directions in
Section VIII.
II. GAME FRAMEWORK
In this section, we abstract the agents’ decision-making
processes in a game–theoretic framework.
A. Agent Decision-Making Model
Consider p agents2—i.e. decision-making entities—indexed
by the set I = {1, . . . , p}. Each agent is modeled as a utility
maximizer that seeks to select xi ∈ R by optimizing
fi(xi, x−i) = f nomi (xi, x−i) + f
inc
i (xi, x−i). (1)
where f nomi (xi, x−i) and f
inc
i (xi, x−i) are the nominal and
incentive components, respectively, of agent i’s utility function
and where x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn−1 is the
collective choices of all agents excluding the i–th agent3.
The choice xi abstracts the agent’s decision; it could rep-
resent, e.g., how much of a particular resource they choose
to consume. The nominal component of fi captures the
agent’s individual preferences over xi and may depend on
the decisions of others x−i. The incentive component models
the portion of the agent’s utility that can be designed by the
planner; it also may depend on the decisions of other agents.
Agent i’s optimization problem is also subject to constraints;
the constraint set is given by Ci = {xi| hi,j(xi) ≥ 0, j =
1, . . . , `i} where each hi,j is assumed to be a concave func-
tion of xi. Such constraints may encode cyber or physical
constraints arising from the underlying system—in the social
game example presented in Section VI-C, we will see that
these constraints are physical bounds. Thus, given x−i, agent
i faces the following optimization problem:
max{fi(xi, x−i)| xi ∈ Ci}. (2)
B. Game Formulation
The game (f1, . . . , fp) is a continuous game on a convex
strategy space C = C1×· · ·×Cp. To model the outcome of the
strategic interactions of agents, we use the Nash equilibrium
concept.
Definition 1. A point x ∈ C is a Nash equilibrium for the
game (f1, . . . , fp) on C if, for each i ∈ I,
fi(xi, x−i) ≥ fi(x′i, x−i) ∀ x′i ∈ Ci. (3)
We say x ∈ C is an ε–Nash equilibrium for ε > 0 if the above
inequality is relaxed:
fi(xi, x−i) + ε ≥ fi(x′i, x−i) ∀ x′i ∈ Ci. (4)
1http://crest.berkeley.edu/
2We refer to the decision-makers as agents and use the term interchangeably
with players.
3Note that while for notational simplicity we assume that xi ∈ R, the work
easily extends to a higher dimensional choice vector for each agent.
We say a point is a local Nash equilibrium (respectively, a
ε–local Nash equilibrium) if there exists Wi ⊂ Ci such that
xi ∈Wi and the above inequalities hold for all x′i ∈Wi.
If each fi is concave in xi and C is convex, then the game is
a p–person concave game. In the seminal work by Rosen [9],
it was shown that a (pure) Nash equilibrium exists for every
concave game.
The Lagrangian of agent i’s optimization problem is given
by
Li(xi, x−i, µi) = fi(xi, x−i) +
∑
j∈Ai(xi) µi,jhi,j(xi) (5)
where Ai(xi) is the active constraint set at xi and µ =
(µ1, . . . , µp) with µi = (µi,j)`ij=1 are the Lagrange multipliers.
Assuming appropriate smoothness conditions on each fi and
hi,j , the differential game form [3], [10]—which characterizes
the first–order conditions of the game—is given by
ω(x, µ) = [D1L1(x, µ1)
> · · · DpLp(x, µp)>]> (6)
where DiLi denotes the derivative of Li with respect to xi.
Consider agent i’s optimization problem (2) with x−i fixed
and where each fi and hi,j for j ∈ {1, . . . , `i}, i ∈ I are
concave, twice continuously differentiable functions. Then, as-
suming an appropriate constraint qualification condition [11],
the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of a
point xi are as follows: there exists µi ∈ R`i+ such that (i)
DiLi(x, µi) = 0; (ii) µihi,j(xi) = 0 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , `i};
(iii) hi,j(xi) ≥ 0 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , `i}. Regardless of the
concavity assumption, the point xi is a local maximizer if
µi,j > 0 and z>D2iiLi(x, µi)z < 0 for all z 6= 0 such that
Dihi,j(xi)
>z = 0 for j ∈ Ai(xi). Such conditions motivate
the following definition.
Definition 2 (Differential Nash Equilibrium). Consider a
game (f1, . . . , fp) on C where fi and hi,j for each j ∈
{1, . . . , `i} and i ∈ I are twice continuously differentiable.
A point x ∈ C ⊂ Rp is a differential Nash equilibrium if
there is a µ ∈ R
∑p
i=1 `i such that the pair (x, µ) satisfies (i)
ω(x, µ) = 0; (ii) for each i ∈ I, z>DiiLi(x, µi)z < 0 for
all z 6= 0 such that Dihi,j(xi)>z = 0, and µi,j > 0 for
j ∈ Ai(xi). If, for a given ε > 0, (i’) ω(x, µ) = ε with all
the other conditions being satisfied, then x is a ε–differential
Nash equilibrium.
The above definition extends the definition of a differential
Nash (if we restrict to Euclidean spaces), first appearing
in [10], to constrained games on Euclidean spaces. Using this
definition, we can also extend Proposition 1 of [10], again
where strategy spaces are restricted to be subsets Euclidean.
Proposition 1. A differential Nash equilibrium of the p–person
concave game (f1, . . . , fp) on C is a local Nash equilibrium.
The proof is straightforward and we leave it to Appendix A.
The proposition says that the conditions of Definition 2 are
sufficient for a local Nash. In contrast to single-agent optimiza-
tion problems, for games, the second order conditions do not
imply the equilibrium is isolated [10]. A sufficient condition
guaranteeing that a Nash equilibrium x is isolated is that the
Jacobian of ω(x, µ), denoted Dω(x, µ), is invertible [3].
We use (necessary and sufficient) optimality conditions on
individual player optimization problems holding other players’
strategies fixed to formulate the utility learning framework.
III. ROBUST UTILITY LEARNING
In previous work, we have explored utility learning and
incentive design as a coupled problem both in theory [3] and
in practice [8], [12], [13]. In the present work, we re-examine
the utility learning problem using statistical methods that serve
to improve estimation and prediction accuracy.
Looking forward, our aim is to fold the new estimation
scheme into the overall incentive design framework. This goal
motivates why we are interested in learning more than a simple
predictive model for agents, but rather a utility-based forecast-
ing framework that accounts for individual preferences.
We parameterize fi by θi = (θi1, . . . , θimi) ∈ Rmi and a
finite set of basis functions {φij(xi, x−i)}mij=1 such that
fi(x; θi) = 〈φi(xi, x−i), θi〉+ f¯i(x) (7)
where φi = [φi,1 · · · φi,mi ]> and f¯i(x) is a function that
captures a priori knowledge of the agent’s utility function
(e.g., the incentive component designed by the planner).
A. Base Utility Estimation Framework
We start by describing the basic utility estimation frame-
work using equilibrium conditions for the game played be-
tween the players. The utility learning framework we propose
is quite broad in that it encompasses a wide class of continuous
games. In previous works [3], [12], [13] we have shown
that the utility learning problem can be formulated as a
convex optimization problem by using first– and second–
order conditions for Nash equilibria. Let us briefly review
this formulation as it serves as the basis for the robust utility
learning method.
Each observation x(k) is assumed to be an ε–approximate
differential Nash equilibrium where the superscript notation
(·)(k) indicates the k–th observation. For each observation
x(k), it may be the case that only a subset of the players,
say Sk ⊂ I at observation k, participate in the game. Then
notationally each observation is such that
x(k) =
(
x
(k)
j
)
j∈Sk
. (8)
If player i participates in ni instances of the game, then there
are ni observations for that player. Let n =
∑p
i=1 ni be the
total number of observations.
We can consider first–order optimality conditions for each
player’s optimization problem and define a residual function
capturing the degree of suboptimality of x(k)i [8], [14]. Indeed,
for player i’s optimization problem, let the residual of the
stationarity condition be given by
r
(k)
s,i (θi, µi) = Difi(x
(k)
i , x
(k)
−i ) +
∑`i
j=1 µ
j
iDihi,j(x
(k)
i ) (9)
and the residual of the complementary conditions be given by
r
j,(k)
c,i (µ) = µ
j
ihi,j(x
(k)
i ), j ∈ {1, . . . , `i}. (10)
Define
r
(k)
c,i (µi) = [r
1,(k)
c,i (µi) · · · r`i,(k)c,i (µi)]. (11)
Using data from the players’ decisions (e.g., lighting votes
from the social game experiment which we describe in Sec-
tion VI-A), the base utility learning framework consists of
solving the optimization problem given by
min
µ,θ
∑p
i=1
∑ni
k=1 χi(r
(k)
s,i (θ, µ), r
(k)
c,i (µ))
s.t. θi ∈ Θi, µi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , p}
(P)
where Θi is a constraint set on the parameters θi that captures
prior information about the objective, χ : Rp × R
∑p
i=1 `i →
R+ is a non-negative, convex penalty function satisfying
χ(z1, z2) = 0 if and only if z1 = 0 and z2 = 0, i.e. any norm
on Rp ×R
∑p
i=1 `i , and the inequality µi ≥ 0 is element-wise.
The goal of this optimization problem—which is a finite
dimensional optimization problem in the θi’s—is to find θi for
each player such that (fˆi)i∈I is consistent (or approximately
consistent) with the data. As is noted in [14], we also remark
that it is important that the sets Θi contain enough prior
information about the objectives fi in order to prevent trivial
solutions. For example, if it is the case that f¯i(x(k)) = 0 for
each k and each Θi = Rmi then the trivial solution θi = 0mi
is feasible. For many applications some a priori knowledge
on part of the utility functions of players may be encoded in
each Θi (e.g., choosing Θi such that θ1i = 1 or similarly
selecting the incentive component of the utility, a design
possibility for the planner [3]) or through other normalization
techniques to prevent such trivial solutions. In the context of
the social game application (in Section VI-C), we explicitly
discuss how to construct this constraint set in such a way that
we ensure the estimated utility functions are concave which
in turn guarantees that there exists a Nash equilibrium to the
estimated game.
B. Robust Utility Learning
Let us now formulate a robust version of the utility learning
framework that allows us to reduce our forecasting error and
learn the noise structure which can be leveraged in extracting
pseudo–coalitions between players which we describe in the
sequel.
Define
X
(k)
i =
[
Dihi(x
(k)
i ) Diφi(x
(k)))
hˆi(x
(k)
i ) 0`i×mi
]
, (12)
where
hˆi(xi) = diag(hi,1(xi), . . . , hi,`i(xi)), (13)
Dihi(xi) = [Dihi,1(xi) · · · Dihi,`i(xi)], (14)
and nd = (`i + 1)n is the total number of data points. The
regressor matrix is then defined as X = diag(X1, · · · , Xp) ∈
Rnd×(`i+1)p where Xi = [(X(1)i )> · · · (X(ni)i )>]>. Define
the regression coefficient
β = [µ11 . . . µ
`1
1 θ1 · · · µ1p . . . µ`pp θp]> ∈ R(`i+1)p (15)
and the observation matrix Y = [Y1 · · · Yp]> ∈ R(`i+1)p
where
Yi = [f¯i(x
(1)) 0`i · · · f¯i(x(ni)) 0`i ]>. (16)
Using the Euclidean norm for χ in (P) leads to an OLS
problem with inequality constraints—i.e. a constrained OLS
(cOLS):
min
β
{‖Y −Xβ‖2∣∣ β ∈ B} (P1)
where B = {β| θi ∈ Θi, µi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I}. Enforcing that each
of the constraint sets Θi is encoded by inequalities on θi, the
above stated problem can be viewed as a classical multiple
linear regression model with inequality constraints described
by the data generation process
Y = Xβ + , β ∈ B (17)
where  = (1, . . . , p) is the error term satisfying: (i)
E(|X) = 0nd×1; (ii) cov(|X) = σ2Ind×nd ; (iii) {i}pi=1
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with a zero mean
and σ2 variance. In addition, we assume  is nonspherical [15].
With this general statistical model we are able to describe
a data generation processes in which the error terms are
correlated or lack constant variance. This fact will be leveraged
in creating coalitions between players as we describe in
Section V.
Mathematically the nonspherical errors are modelled by
cov(|X) = G  0, G ∈ Rnd×nd . (18)
One drawback of this technique is that, given nonspherical
standard errors, the cOLS estimator is biased—that is, it does
not satisfy the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) prop-
erty, a result of the Gauss–Markov theorem [15, Theorem 1,
Chapter 5]. However, we can derive an unbiased estimator by
multiplying (17) on the left with G−
1
2 . This leads to the cGLS
statistical model given by
(G−
1
2Y ) = (G−
1
2X)β + (G−
1
2 ), β ∈ B (19)
which now satisfies the BLUE property. In general, the explicit
form of cov(|X) = G is unknown. We use the residuals (17)
to infer the noise by imposing structural constraints on G.
We remark that there are many types of noise structures
that can be used for imposing structure on G. We provide
two example noise structures that could be used. The first
is block diagonal structure [15, Chapter 5]; in particular, we
impose that G = blkdiag(K1, · · · ,Kp) ∈ Rnd×nd where
Ki = blkdiag(Bi,1, . . . , Bi,ni) ∈ R(`i+1)ni×(`i+1)ni with
each Bi,k ∈ R(`i+1)×(`i+1). Estimating β with cOLS, we get
βˆcOLS with residual vector e = Y −XβˆcOLS ∈ R(`i+1)n. The
residual vector e can be decomposed into residuals for each
player by writing e = [e>1 · · · e>p ]>. We use ei to compute
an estimate Kˆi of Ki which is, in turn, used to compute Gˆ.
The residuals come in triplets since for each k, Y (k)i ∈ R`i+1.
For ease of presentation and comprehension, we will use a
paired index for the residuals instead of a single index. For
example, for player i, there are ni instances at which we
have `i observations. Let (ei)k,j = (ei)(`i+1)(k−1)+j where
k ∈ {1, . . . , ni} and j ∈ {1, . . . , (`i + 1)}. With the residuals,
we can then form estimates Bˆi,k ∈ R(`i+1)×(`i+1) of Bi,k
where Bˆi,k takes the form
Bˆi,k = [(Bˆi,k)l,j)]
`i+1
l,j=1 (20)
with (Bˆi,k)j,j = n−1i
∑ni
t=1 e
2
t,j and (Bˆi,k)l,j =
n−1i
∑ni
t=1 et,jet,l for j 6= l. We provide this noise structure
as an example because in our formulation we allow for
constraints on the players’ optimization problems so that
for each iteration k, we in fact have multidimensional
observations as can be seen in (12).
The second noise structure we consider is adapted from the
HC4 estimator [16] and is given by
Gˆ = diag
(
e21
(1−b1)δ1 ,
e22
(1−b2)δ2 , · · · ,
e2nd
(1−bnd )
δnd
)
(21)
where δi = min {4, ndbi/(
∑nd
i=1 bi)} and the bi’s are the di-
agonal elements of B = X(X>X)−1X>. With this structure,
the penalty for each residual increases with bi/
∑nd
j=1 bj . As
with the previous noise structure, we use the fitted cOLS
estimator βˆcOLS and residuals to get an initial Gˆ. We selected
to present this noise structure because it is computationally
efficient compared to many other noise structures.
In both cases, we substitute the inferred noise, Gˆ, into the
cGLS statistical model (19) to get the one–step constrained
Feasible GLS (cFGLS) estimators. We iterate between the
estimation of Gˆ and βcFGLS either until convergence or for
a fixed number of iterations to prevent overfitting. To resolve
this trade-off and find the optimal iteration size we adopt a
simple cross validation method.
C. Boosting with Ensemble Methods
In this subsection, we describe several ensemble methods.
Combined with a bootstrapping process, ensemble methods
not only boost the size of what can often be a small data
set in practice but also allow us to improve the estimator
performance and explore the bias–variance tradeoff.
1) Bootstrapping and Bagging: Bootstrapping is a tech-
nique for asymptotic approximation of the bias and standard
error of an estimator in a complex and noisy statistical
model [15], [17]. We employ wild bootstrapping to generate
a pseudo-data set from which we generate several weak
estimators that we then combine using bagging. While we
assume that E(Y |X) = Xβ, we also allow for heteroskedas-
ticity by conditioning on the residual transformations that
we imposed in the noise structure. Wild bootstrapping is a
technique of parametric bootstrapping that is consistent with
heteroskedastic inference and cFGLS data generation.
The bootstrapping process can be described in two steps:
First, we fit our cFGLS model which gives us βˆcFGLS. Then,
generate N replicates of pseudo–data using the data generation
process
Y˜ = XβˆcFGLS + Φ(e)ε, (22)
where Y˜ ∈ Rnd is the new observation vector (pseudo-
observations), βˆcFGLS ∈ Rnd is the cFGLS estimator, ε ∼
N(0, Ind×nd), e ∈ Rnd is the residual vector given by
e = Y˜ − XβˆcFGLS and Φ : Rnd → Rnd is a nonlinear
transformation such that Φ(e) = Gˆ
1
2 ∈ Rnd×nd . Since
E(Φ(e)ε|X) = Φ(e)E(ε|X) = Φ(e)E(ε) = 0nd×nd , using
the data generation process in (24), we resample from i.i.d
variables.
Bagging in regression models and trees is a technique for
reducing the overall variance [17]. Using the N replicates
of pseudo–data generated by wild bootstrapping, we train
N different models. We combine the resulting bootstrapped
estimators by averaging:
βˆbag =
1
N
∑N
j=1 βˆcFGLS,j (23)
where βˆcFGLS,j is the estimator using the j–th pseudo–data
sample. Bagging works efficiently with high variance models
and does not hurt the overall performance of the statistical
model. We refer to the bagged estimates as bagged mega-
learners since they combine several weak learners/estimators.
Using wild bootstrapping, the empirical covariance matrix of
βˆ is an asymptotic approximation of the covariance matrix and
is given by
Cˆβ =
1
N
∑N
j=1
(
βˆcFGLS,j − βˆbag
)(
βˆcFGLS,j − βˆbag
)>
. (24)
Asymptotic estimation of the empirical covariance matrix
reveals hidden structures between players and is what we
leverage in the correlation utility learning procedures.
2) Bootstrapping and Bumping: In a similar fashion as the
bagging ensemble method, we combine bumping—a method
for fitting cFGLS estimators by using a random search over
the model space [18]—with the wild bootstrapping generated
pseudo-data. In particular, we apply a stochastic search over
several different statistical models coming from a similar data
process—i.e. the data process in (24).
We add the original training data sample to the N replicates
of pseudo-data generated by the wild bootstrapping process
and we use this data to estimate N +1 cFGLS estimators. We
evaluate these estimators on the training set and select the one
with the least training error. The cFGLS bumping estimator is
given by
βˆbump = arg min
βˆcFGLS,j
‖Y˜ −XβˆcFGLS,j‖22 (25)
where βˆcFGLS,j’s are the cFGLS estimators from derived from
the bootstrapped data.
3) Gradient Boosting: We combine L2–gradient
boosting—which is a repeated least squares fitting of
residuals [19]—with cFGLS. Gradient boosting is a boosting
technique that uses an L2 loss function combined with a
gradient descent update method for combining weak learners
at each iteration. Boosting estimators are trained in sequence
using a weighted version of the original data set. In general,
boosting methods are extremely useful for combining models
by incrementally training each new model by emphasizing
the errors of the previous training instances. They are
used extensively in classification methods such as logistic
regression and support vector machines.
Repeated residual fitting is applied until we reach iteration
mstop, a stopping criteria selected using Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) to avoid overfitting [20]. . The procedure is
detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 L2–gradient boosting with cFGLS
1: function CFGLSGRADBOOST(X ,Y ,ν)
2: Hˆ ← X(X>X)−1X> . compute Hˆ matrix
3: ν ← s ∈ (0, 1] . set shrinkage (updating) parameter
4: mstop ← 1 . iteration number
5: choose Mmax . upper iterations bound
6: AIClist ←[ ] . create empty list
7: Compute stopping iteration time mstop:
8: while mstop < Mmax do
9: Rmstop ← (Ind×nd − νHˆ)mstop
10: Bmstop ← (Ind×nd −Rmstop)
11: σ2mstop ← n−1d
∑nd
i=1(Yi − (BmstopY )i)2
12: AICmstop ←
(
log σ2mstop +
1+(Tr(Bmstop ))/nd
1−(Tr(Bmstop )+2)/nd
)
13: AIClist.append(AICmstop)
14: mstop ← mstop + 1
15: end while
16: Mˆ ← arg minAICtotal . find minimum point
17: βˆcFGLS ← estimate of βcFGLS using cFLGS
18: eFGLS ← Y −XβˆcFGLS . residuals estimation
19: e← ecFGLS . initialize residuals
20: k ← 1 . iteration index
21: βboost ← βˆcFGLS . initialize cFGLS boosted learner
22: Compute boosted learner βboost:
23: while k < Mˆ do
24: βi ← (X>X)−1X>e . residuals fitting
25: βˆboost ← βˆboost + νβi . update formula
26: e← Y −Xβˆboost . residuals update
27: k ← k + 1
28: end while
29: end function
IV. APPLICATION TO BERTRAND-NASH COMPETITION
Let us illustrate the framework and its performance of the
robust utility learning framework before moving on by apply-
ing it to estimate market demand functions under Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [21]–[23]). The toy model can
be thought of as an abstraction of Bertrand-price setting for
commodities such as oil, gas, and coal [24], [25].
Consider two firms competing to sell their product by
setting the price p1 and p2 for firm 1 and 2, respectively.
The firms utility functions are their revenue, i.e. fi(p1, p2) =
piDi(p1, p2, ξ) where Di is the demand function for firm i and
ξ ∼ N (1.5, 0.5) is a random variable that captures the fact that
demand is dependent on economic indicators in addition to the
prices set by the firms. In this stylized example, we consider
linear demand functions given by
Di(p1, p2, ξ) = θi,1 + θi,2p1 + θi,3p2 + νξ (26)
where θi = (θi,j)3j=1 are unknown parameters to be estimated
and ν = 1.5 is a known parameter. The prices are constrained
to be in the interval [0, p¯] where p¯ ∈ R+ is the upper bound.
We let θ1 = (−1.0, 0.5,−1) and θ2 = (0.3,−1, 0.3) be the
ground truth values for the parameters we wish to estimate.
Thus, f¯i(p1, p2) = νξ and examining the marginal revenue
functions Difi(p1, p2) we have that φ1(p1, p2) = [1 2p1 p2]>,
and φ2 = [1 p1 2p2]>.
TABLE I
MEAN SQUARE ERROR (MSE) OF FORECASTING USING THE PROPOSED ROBUST
UTILITY LEARNING METHODS VS COLS ESTIMATORS FOR BERTRAND-NASH
COMPETITION. THE BEST PERFORMING METHOD IS INDICATED IN BOLD TEXT FOR
EACH OF THE FIRMS.
Firm 1 bagging boosting bumping cOLS
MSE 0.05 0.51 0.65 1.62
Firm 2 bagging boosting bumping cOLS
MSE 1.58 0.71 0.89 2.54
In order to generate the data set we add a noise
term ε ∼ N (0, 0.5) to the marginal revenue functions,
i.e. Difi(p1, p2) + ε, and solve for the Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium. We simulate the game between the firms 600 times.
In the robust utility learning framework, for this example,
we employ the HC4 noise structure and compute the cOLS,
cFGLS, bagging, boosting and bumping estimators. We use
a 10–fold cross validation proceedure to prevent over-fitting.
Table I contains error using two metrics for both firms.
Figure 1 shows the forecast for part of the testing set using
cOLS and each of the ensemble methods as compared to the
ground truth. While bagging performed best for firm 1 and
boosting for firm 2 in the particular instantiation of this toy
example, the performance more generally is dependent on the
noise structure in the demand and marginal revenue functions,
the sample size, and the dynamics between the two firms.
However, it is interesting to point out that as we increase the
variance on ξ, each of the ensemble methods performance stay
relatively the same yet the cOLS error increases significantly.
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Fig. 1. Forcast for Firms 1 & 2 using cOLS and each of the ensemble
methods. The ground truth prices are depicted by the blue dots; the cOLS
forecasts are depicted in black, the bagging forecasts are depicted in gray,
the bumping forecasts are depicted in green, and the boosting forecasts are
depicted in gold.
V. CORRELATED UTILITY LEARNING
In this section, we describe how learned correlations be-
tween players can be leveraged to boost estimator perfor-
mance. We add a second step to the estimation procedure in
which we craft a new game where players’ utilities are com-
posed of their original estimated utility plus some combination
of other players’ utilities weighted by the estimated correlation
between players.
When the correlations between players are positive, we are
creating what we refer to as pseudo-coalitions since players
are not explicitly agreeing to collude in the game but rather
are doing so implicitly. The degree of coalition is discovered
by the robust utility learning process through estimating the
empirical covariance Cˆβ , i.e. asymptotic approximation of the
covariance matrix—of βˆest where we use the notation βˆest to
abstractly denote the estimator derived from whichever of the
methods described in the previous section is employed. On
the other hand, when the correlations between players are
negative, by combining their utilities we aim to take advantage
of active players’ richer data sets in predicting the behavior
of players with less variation and frequency in their observed
actions.
We refer to the learned utility—fˆi for player i—from the
robust utility learning framework as the base utility and it is
given by
fˆi(xi, x−i; θˆi) = f¯i(xi, x−i) + 〈φi(xi, x−i), θˆi〉 (27)
where θˆi is extracted from βˆest,i.
Using the correlations we learn when we estimate fˆi, we
construct a new utility gˆi by combining scaled versions of
a subset (potentially all) of the other agents’ utilities that are
correlated with agent i. We formulate an optimization problem
to deterimine the scaling coefficients. The correlated utility gˆi
for player i is given by
gˆi(xi, x−i) =
∑
j∈Ki zi,jσi,j f¯i(xi, x−i)
+ σi,j〈φi(xi, x−i), θˆj〉 (28)
where Ki ⊂ Ii a subset of the players correlated with
player i, σi,i is the estimated variance of player i determined
by the empirical covariance matrix, σi,j is the covariance
between the parameter estimates for player i and j also
determined by the empirical covariance matrix, and zi,j are
scaling constants to be optimized. We refer to the resulting
game as an approximated correlation game4.
Given the form of gˆi, our goal is to select the scaling
constants zi,j in order to reduce the forecasting error. Anal-
ogous to the base utility learning framework presented in
Section III-A, using our training data, we formulate a convex
optimization problem using optimality conditions on each
player’s individual optimization problem where we assume
that player i is optimizing gˆi with respect to its own choice
variable xi. In particular, we solve a convex optimization
problem formulated as follows. Define the vector zi ∈ R|Ki|
by zi = (zi,j)j∈Ki and let z = (zi)i∈I . For player i’s
4We remark that there exists an equilibrium concept called correlated
equilibrium [26] which generalizes a Nash equilibrium by characterizing cor-
relations between randomized strategies; we mention this only to alleviate any
potential confusion. The equilibrium concept we utilize for the approximated
correlation game is still a pure Nash equilibrium and there is no coordinating
mechanism.
optimization problem max{gˆi(xi, x−i)| xi ∈ Ci}, let the
residual of the stationarity condition be given by
r
(k)
s,i (zi, µi; θˆ) = Digˆi(x
(k)
i , x
(k)
−i ) +
∑`i
j=1 µ
j
iDihi,j(x
(k)
i )
(29)
and the residual of the complementary conditions be given by
r
j,(k)
c,i (µi) = µ
j
ihi,j(x
(k)
i ), j ∈ {1, . . . , `i}. (30)
As before, let r(k)c,i (µi) = [r
1,(k)
c,i (µi) · · · r`i,(k)c,i (µi)]. Define
Qi ∈ Rni×|Ki| by
Qi =
[
σi,jD
2
i,if¯i(x
(k))
]ni
k=1,j∈Ki . (31)
and qi ∈ Rni by
qi =
[∑
j∈Ki σi,j〈D2i,iφi(x(k)), θˆj〉
]ni
k=1
. (32)
Then, we have the following convex optimization problem to
determine the scaling factors zi,j :
min
z,µ
∑p
i=1
∑ni
k=1 χi(r
(k)
s,i (zi, µi; θˆ), r
(k)
c,i (µi))
s.t. Qizi + qi ≤ 0, µi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I
(P’)
Solving P’ gives us estimated correlated utilities gˆi for each
i ∈ I that we then use to forecast the players’ decisions.
VI. APPLICATION TO SMART BUILDING SOCIAL GAME
We now specialize the robust and correlated utility learning
frameworks to the smart building social game.
A. Social Game Experimental Set-Up
Our experimental setup is in a collaboratory space—an
open, shared work space with cubicles—within the CREST
center on the UC Berkeley campus. We crafted a social game
such that occupants in this collaboratory freely vote according
to their usage preferences of shared resources and are rewarded
with points based on how energy efficient their strategy is in
comparison with the other occupants. We employ a lottery
mechanism consisting of three Amazon gift cards executed
bi-weekly to reward occupants; occupants with more points
are more likely to win the lottery.
The office is divided into five lighting zones and two
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) zones. In
this space, there is a total 20 occupants who are eligible to
participate in the social game. If the occupants are not present
in the office, they are excluded from the game at that time
instant. When they arrive at the office, they can rejoin the
game. To enforce the rule that those who are not present in
the space cannot vote remotely, we executed a simple presence
detection algorithm based on their power usage [27], [28].
We have installed a Lutron5 system for precise control of
the lighting setting (dim level of the lights) in the office as well
as desk–level energy monitoring devices (i.e. ACME wireless
sensors [29]) to meter the energy usage of each occupant. In
addition, we have modified the HVAC system so that it can be
precisely controlled. We have verified prior to our experiment
5http://www.lutron.com/en-US/Pages/default.aspx
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Graphical user interface (GUI) for energy based social game: (a) Display, in table form, of points and votes for energy consumption, HVAC, and
lights. (b) Display of the GUI for logging lighting setting preferences.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Occupants can access a variety of information when they log into
the social game portal, including various displays of energy consumption
by other participants in the game: (a) Display of current light level and
temperature in the collaboratory space; energy efficiency of the lights is coded
by color where light green indicates higher energy efficiency. (b) Display of
collaboratory floor plan with dots indicating where present and participating
players sit. Players not in the office are excluded from the game. The color
of the dot indicates the level of energy efficiency of the player as compare
to the other participants; green indicates higher efficiency while red indicates
lower efficiency.
that implemented control of these systems results in expected
performance.
We have developed a platform to interface with the oc-
cupants as well as manage and process collected data. The
platform includes a web portal and mobile app that the
occupants may use to participate in the game. It also allows for
occupants to visualize different aspects of the social game—
e.g., the lighting setting and the energy efficiency level of
different occupants or the entire building—as well as view
the point level and historical voting record of other occupants
among many other statistics. Figure 2 shows the user interface
for viewing points and logging votes. Figure 3a shows a
visualization of the current light level using a green–to–red
color scale with green being more energy efficient. The current
temperature is also displayed. Figure 3b shows a visualization
of each present and participating occupant’s energy efficiency
level.
In this paper, we report on a social game experiment
conducted based only the lighting shared resource6. Prior to
the start of the social game experiment, the lighting setting
was 90% of the maximum possible lighting setting. At the
start of the social game experiment, we set a default lighting
setting which acts as the suggested lighting setting and is
the dim level setting in the office if, e.g., no occupants are
participating in the game. Throughout the game, we adjust
the default lighting setting as well as the points. The lottery
mechanism coupled with the points we distribute compose the
incentive component of the feedback to the participants while
the default lighting level is the physical control component of
the feedback. These two mechanisms act as our control inputs
and our feedback mechanism to the participants. We seek to
design them by taking into consideration the preferences of
the participants. In this way, these mechanisms close the loop
around the participant and with our proposed utility learning
scheme, these mechanisms can be modified to encourage more
energy efficient resource consumption.
The game is designed to leverage interactions amongst
occupants, who win points based on how energy efficient their
lighting vote is compared to others. An occupant’s vote is for
the lighting setting in their zone as well as for neighboring
zones. The occupants select their desired lighting setting in
6We remark that while our experimental platform is capable of conducting
a social game that includes lights, HVAC, and personal energy consumption,
we only report on an experiment that focuses on lighting in order to isolate
combined effects from these different resources. In on-going experiments, we
are examining all aspects jointly.
the continuous interval [0, 100] where each value represents
the percentage of the maximum lighting setting possible in
the space. The occupants can vote as frequently as they like
and the average of all the occupants’ current votes sets the
implemented lighting setting in the collaboratory. An occupant
can leave the lighting setting as the default level after logging
in or they can change it depending on their preferences and
other environmental factors that may affect their choice.
The experimental trials reported on in this paper were
conducted over the period of 285 days7. Experiments with
4 different default levels, {10%, 20%, 60%, 90%}, were con-
ducted, covering a spectrum of lighting conditions. Since
occupants were allowed to vote whenever they chose, their
response rate per day varies. The data set we collected consists
of occupant votes (meaning the lighting level they select) over
the period of investigation as well as the points that were
distributed to each occupant. We collected 6,885 votes over
the period of the experiment.
B. Brief Background
In order to place the work pertaining to building energy
efficiency in the context of the state of the art, we briefly
overview existing approaches.
Recognizing that HVAC systems are responsible for a
large portion of building energy consumption, many control
theoretic approaches such as [30], [31] derive model predictive
and distributed control polices for HVAC systems. While these
control theoretic approaches make efforts to account for the
presence of occupants, they tend to ignore occupant behaviors
and, more importantly, their heterogeneous preferences.
There are other works that make strides towards incorpo-
rating behavioral models of occupants; e.g., the authors of
[32] employ a multi-agent systems approach to develop a
framework for incorporating occupant comfort preferences and
the authors of [33] develop behavioral models for lighting
usage. In a more active approach, the authors of [34] develop
a collaborative setting definition paradigm in which occupants
and facilities managers submit preferences and requirements
and a rule engine tries to resolve them in order to create
a universal control policy. While occupants’ preferences are
taken as inputs to the building control design, it is not clear that
it is possible to satisfy all the occupants’ comfort preferences
simultaneously with those of the facilities manager; hence, the
misalignment between preferences and incentives remains.
In our approach, on the other hand, we leverage a social
game that creates (friendly) competition between users and
employs incentives to resolve conflicting preferences by com-
pensating users. Within the energy application domain, gami-
fication has been largely used for education or awareness (see,
e.g., [35], [36]). There are works that are closely related to ours
in the sense that they also recognize that occupants are self-
interested participants in smart buildings and try to account
for their strategic behavior. For example, in [37], the authors
develop an interesting scheme for engaging occupants directly
in DR. Analogous to our approach, occupants are modeled
as utility maximizers in a game theoretic context where they
7The period of the experiment was 2014/3/3–2014/12/14.
are incentivized to curtail their consumption in response to
an event. Our approach differs in that we focus on shared
resources such as lighting and HVAC instead of personal
devices (e.g., desk appliances). Furthermore, it is assumed
in [37] that the type space (i.e. their preferences) of the users
is a known finite set of two possible values. We do not assume
the facility manager knows the utility function or the type of
the users and we propose an algorithm for learning this utility
function from observations of decisions.
While incorporating occupant preferences into building au-
tomation is not novel in and of itself, we propose an innovative
algorithm for learning occupant preferences in competitive
environments and, moreover, learn how their actions are corre-
lated. Such correlations can be leveraged in improving incen-
tive mechanisms to shape users’ preferences thereby providing
more flexibility. Our method is applied to real-world data from
experimental trials we conducted as opposed to simulations
as is the case with many existing works. Furthermore, it is
agnostic to the application and could be applied in general to
other scenarios in which users are competing for constrained
but shared resources. For example, the utility learning method
can be easily adapted to learning preferences of individual
buildings interacting with an aggregator or learning prefer-
ences of drivers seeking on-street parking [7]. In each of these
cases, there exists a planner—the aggregator or department
of transportation—tasked with managing a resource being
consumed by self-interested users.
C. Occupant Decision-Making Model
Each agent’s vote xi is constrained to be in the interval
[0, 100] ⊂ R. Let x¯ denote the average of the lighting votes
and the setting that is implement—e.g., at observation instance
indexed by k, x¯(k) = 1|Sk|
∑
j∈Sk x
(k)
j . We model each
agent’s utility as being composed of two basis functions that
capture the tradeoff between desired lighting (satisfaction) and
desire to win. The lighting satisfaction an occupant feels may
be a function of several factors including their productivity
(ability to perform their job) as well as physical comfort. We
abstractly model their desired lighting level using a Taguchi
loss function, ψi(xi, x−i) = − (x¯− xi)2, which is interpreted
as modeling occupant dissatisfaction in such a way that it is
increasing as variation increases from their reported desired
lighting setting (their vote) [38].
We acknowledge that an agent may have some internal
desired lighting level that is different than its vote; e.g., the
agent may realize that voting an extreme value pushes the
average toward a more desirable setting. This type of gaming
results in moral hazard type issues which can be addressed
in the incentive design step [1], [2]. Thus, we set this type
of gaming aside for the time being, and focus instead on
the unknown preferences—a different kind of asymmetric
information that leads to adverse selection—between lighting
and winning.
Points are distributed by the planner using the relationship
ρ(xb − xi)(p(xb − x¯))−1 where xb is the baseline setting for
the lights. For the experiment xb = 90%, i.e. the lighting
setting used before the implementation of the social game.
However, we model each occupant as having a winning basis
function given by φi(xi, x−i) = −ρc (xi)2 where ρ is the
total number of points distributed by the planner and c is a
scaling factor that is used primarily to scale the two terms of
the utility function given that we artificially inflate the points
offered in order to increase their appeal to players and thus
induce greater participation8. The form of the winning function
can be interpreted as capturing the perception that by voting
zero, the occupant is selecting the action that will provide the
greatest return of points given that points are awarded based
on how energy efficient their vote is compared to others9.
Hence, the utility functions for the social game are modeled
as fi(xi, x−i; θi) = θiφi(xi, x−i)+ψi(xi, x−i). The constraint
sets Ci for each player are determined by the box constraints on
the lighting vote for that player, i.e. Ci = {xi ∈ R| hi,j(xi) ≥
0, j ∈ {1, 2}} where hi,1(xi) = 100− xi and hi,2(xi) = xi.
In order to formulate (P) for the social game application,
we need to determine the admissible parameter sets Θi, i ∈ I
in such a way that we ensure the estimated utility functions
are concave and such that equilibria of the estimated game
are isolated. We derive a lower bound θLB such that all θi ∈
Θi = {θi ∈ R| θi > θLB}, i ∈ I induce games with these
characteristics. To this end, we utilize the second derivative
condition on players’ utility functions; that is, if for each i ∈ I,
D2i,ifi(x) < 0, then the game is concave. Computing D
2
i,ifi
and using some algebra, we have that θi > −(cρ)−1(1−p−1)2
where the right-hand side is a negative non-increasing function
of p. Thus, concavity is ensured regardless of the number of
players by setting p = 2, the minimum number of players in
a non-cooperative game. Then, given fixed ρ and 0 < ζ <<
1, the lower bound θ¯LB = −(4cρ)−1 + ζ will guarantee the
estimated game is concave.
If Dω(x, µ) is invertible, we know that differential Nash
equilibria are isolated [10]. Hence, we can augment the
constraint sets Θi to encode this condition. Given the structure
of the utility functions, Dω(x, µ) is simply the game Hessian
H = [Hi,j ]
p
j,i=1 with Hi,i = D
2
i,ifi and Hi,j = D
2
i,jfi. Hence,
if H is invertible, then the differential Nash are isolated; this
is guaranteed for p ≥ 4 provided the constraint defined by
θ¯LB = −(4cρ)−1 + ζ using ζ = 10−2. Indeed, let H(p)
denote the game Hessian as a function of the number of
players and note that for a particular p, with some simple
algebra, it is easy to write H(p) as a off-diagonal matrix
constant matrix such that Hii = di + α and Hi,j = α where
di = −2(1−1/p)−2cρθi and α = 2(p−1)/p2. It is straight-
forward to verify by determining the eigenvalues of H as p
varies via the method described in [40] that for p ≥ 4, H will
8Inflating the points is a process of framing [39]—that is, dependent on how
the reward system is presented to agents greatly impacts their participation.
Framing is routinely used in rewards programs for credit cards among many
other point-based programs. The scaling factor c in the winning function
removes the framing effect from the estimation procedure. It is selected to
ensure the scale of the two basis functions are similar.
9We explored other forms of the winning function including the log
function, a quasi-concave function that is typically used to represent how
individuals value money since it represents the diminishing returns property
well [12]. However, the quadratic form of the function we report on here
significantly outperformed other choices so that, for the purpose of a pre-
scriptive model, it captures the agents’ perceptions about the point distribution
mechanism and their value more accurately.
be invertible . For the social game data, at each observation
indexed by k, the number of participating players is at least
4. Thus, to ensure concavity and isolated equilibria of the
estimated social game, we define Θi = {θi ∈ R| θi > θ¯LB}
with θ¯LB = −(cρ4)−1 + ζ with ζ = 10−2.
VII. UTILITY LEARNING RESULTS
We now present the results of the proposed robust utility
learning method applied to data collected from the social game
experiment.
As we previously described, our data set consists of the
votes logged by the players which vote throughout the day.
We present estimation results for the complete data set of
all the votes—which we refer to as the dynamic data set—
and estimation results for an aggregated data set constructed
by taking the average of a players’ votes over the course of
each day in the experiment—this is referred to as the average
data set. While this aggregation significantly reduces the size
of our data set, it smooths the players’ voting profiles and
increases the size of active players in each game—occupants
may arrive or leave the office when they so choose. This
average data set also reduces the computational load, which
may be beneficial to a facilities manager in the incentive design
process, especially if the incentive scheme is quasi-static and
uses historical data to generate the next incentive. The dynamic
data set is much richer, being composed of every vote (a total
of 6, 885 votes) the occupants made throughout the duration
of the experiment (285 days). The time from one vote to
the next may be several minutes to hours depending on the
activity of the occupants. This data set is much larger and
thus, increases the computational load. However, it allows us
to extract more distinct player profiles and can support real-
time incentive design schemes.
We present results for both data sets using data from the
period of the experiment in which the default lighting setting
was 20%—the results for the other default lighting settings
are similar. The period of the experiment where the default
lighting setting was 20% consisted of 42 days and thus the
size of the averaged data set is 42. Over this period there were
220 votes by occupants, which is the size of the dynamic data
set. We divide each of the data sets into training (80% of the
data) and testing (20% of the data) sets and apply each of the
methods discussed in Section III. We apply a 10–fold cross
validation [17] procedure to limit overfitting.
A. Forecasting via Robust Utility Learning
We estimate the parameters using cFGLS and the ensemble
methods bagging, bumping, and boosting for both the average
and dynamic data sets. For gradient boosting, we use the HC4
noise structure (see (21)) since the leverage values bii of B are
larger [16]; in each of the other methods, we used the block
diagonal noise structure (see (20)).
Using the estimated utility functions, we simulate the game
using a projected gradient descent algorithm which is known
to converge for concave games [42]. In Figure 4a and 4b, we
compare the ground truth voting data to the predictions for
each of the learning schemes using the dynamic and averaged
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Fig. 4. Forecasting results for (a) dynamic data and (b) averaged data for the default lighting setting 20: For the dynamic data, the x–axis values indicate
the index of when a choice was made by one or more of the occupants (i.e. when the implemented lighting setting is changed); the time from one index to
the next may be several minutes to hours depending on the activity of the occupants. For the averaged data, the x–axis values are dates (month and day).
The ground truth average of the lighting votes is depicted by the blue dots; the forecast for cOLS is depicted in black; the forecast for bagging is depicted
in gray; the forecast for bumping is depicted in green; the forecast for boosting is depicted in gold. The forecast for the robust utility learning methods is
approximately near the ground truth for both data sets while the cOLS estimates produce Nash equilibria with a large error.
TABLE II
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR (RMSE), MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR (MAE) AND
MEAN ABSOLUTE SCALED ERROR (MASE) [41] OF FORECASTING USING THE
PROPOSED ROBUST UTILITY LEARNING METHODS VS COLS ESTIMATORS FOR BOTH
DATA SETS IN DEFAULT LIGHTING SETTING 20. THE BEST PERFORMING METHOD IS
INDICATED IN BOLD TEXT FOR EACH OF THE DATA SETS, DYNAMIC AND AVERAGE.
Dynamic, fˆi bagging boosting bumping cOLS
RMSE 8.31 10.11 12.56 22.53
MAE 5.20 6.55 6.38 18.35
MASE 2.08 6.38 2.55 7.34
Averaged, fˆi bagging boosting bumping cOLS
RMSE 2.05 1.68 1.96 9.36
MAE 1.58 1.31 1.48 6.01
MASE 0.71 0.59 0.67 2.69
data sets, respectively. Our proposed robust models—i.e. using
the estimated parameters obtained via bagging, bumping, and
boosting—capture most of the variation in the true votes (in
both data sets) and significantly outperform cOLS. In Table II,
using three metrics—Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Mean
Absolute Error (MAE), and Mean Absolute Scaled Error
(MASE)—we report the forecasting error for each of the
methods.
The estimated models using our robust utility learning
methods significantly reduce the forecasting error as compared
to cOLS. The cOLS method has particularly poor forecasting
performance on the dynamic data set since it does not capture
the correlated error terms describing the interactions between
users. Moreover, our robust methods perform better than cOLS
with the averaged data set even though the sample size is
small.
As for the ensemble methods, bagging outperforms the other
three methods when using the dynamic data set. On the other
hand, for the averaged data set, gradient boosting gives the
least forecasting error. This is in large part due to the fact that
we use the HC4 noise structure. Since the average data set has
been smoothed, we expect less correlation between players
and the HC4 noise structure captures this.
B. Estimated Utility Functions
Figure 5 shows the estimated utility functions and their
contour plots for occupants 2 and 8—passive and aggressive
occupants respectively—using the parameters obtained via the
bagging ensemble method with the dynamic data set. We
remark that we do not observe the actual value of agents’
utilities; we instead observe only the agents’ decisions. The
purpose of the figures is to show the estimated utility shapes
for players with significantly different voting profiles (the
observable we have). The particular occupants we selected
represent players that prefer winning to lighting satisfaction
(occupant 8) and players that prefer lighting satisfaction to
winning (occupant 2). In particular, occupant 2’s estimated
utility function appears to be higher at greater lighting settings.
Exactly the opposite occurs for occupant 8 whose estimated
utility function indicates that despite changes in the average
lighting vote of other players, occupant 8 aggressively votes
for a zero lighting setting which returns the most points.
For comparison—and to highlight the improvement that the
robust utility learning framework offers—in Figure 6 we show
the estimated utility function for occupant 8 using cOLS. What
we see is a very different utility function that indicates occu-
pant 8 cares more about lighting satisfaction than winning—
indicated by the fact that its utility is not maximized at zero.
This is misleading since occupant 8 predominately votes for
zero. This is significant since incentive/control design based
on such an erroneous utility function may lead to very poor
performance and occupant dissatisfaction.
C. Bias Approximation and Bias–Variance Tradeoff
Forecasting accuracy can be enhanced by allowing for a
small amount of bias if it results in a large reduction in
variance. For a process Y = Xθ + , the Mean Square Error
(MSE) characterizes the bias–variance tradeoff :
MSE(x) = E[(Y − θ>estx)2] (33)
= (E[θ>estx]− Y )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
bias
+E[(θ>estx− E[θ>estx])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
variance
(34)
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Fig. 5. Bagging estimated utility functions—using the dynamic data set—of (a) agent 2 and (b) agent 8. The functions are plotted as a function of each
agent’s own vote x2 (resp. x8) and other players’ votes x−2 (resp. x−8). Notice that agent 8, a very aggressive player, is indifferent to the choices of the
other agents as indicated by the fact that its utility is maximized in the same location given any value of x−8. On the other hand, occupant 2 responds to
changes in the other agents’ votes and appears to prefer a greater lighting settings (more illumination). This indicates that there are different types of players
and thus, incentives may need to be designed individually for these player types in order to elicit the desired response.
x8
0
20
40
60
80
100
x−8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
fˆ8
10e3
5e3
0e3
−5e3
−10e3
Fig. 6. Agent 8’s cOLS estimated utility function—using the dynamic data
set—plotted as a function of (x8, x−8). This figure demonstrates that using
cOLS (the worst performing estimator) results in learning a utility function
that is not representative of this type of player’s behavior (as can be seen by
comparing to Figure 5b). Incentives or control designed using this function
may result in performance.
Introducing bias in exchange for reduced variance is widely
used in ridge regression and in lasso techniques in the form
of a priori knowledge [17]. In our robust utility learning
framework, we introduce noise structures that approximate the
true data process so that we can fit cFGLS estimators that
are nearly unbiased for those players whose historical voting
record has a large amount of variation.
We approximate the bias for each of the estimators. In
Table III, we present cFGLS estimates obtained using the
dynamic data during the time window in which the default
lighting setting was 20%10 for selected occupants—the most
active players—as well as the approximated bias for the
estimates generated by bagging, bumping, and boosting.
10The results for the other default lighting settings are similar.
TABLE III
THE CFGLS ESTIMATOR VALUE AND THE BAGGING, GRADIENT
BOOSTING AND BUMPING ENSEMBLE METHODS BIAS APPROXIMATION
FOR THE MOST ACTIVE USERS. WE UTILIZED THE DYNAMIC DATA SET
FROM THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE DEFAULT LIGHTING SETTING WAS SET
TO 20. IN BOLD, WE DENOTE THE OCCUPANTS WITH NEARLY UNBIASED
ESTIMATORS.
Id cFGLS Bagging Bias Boosting Bias Bumping Bias
2 -0.7 0.11 0.17 0.02
6 0.5 1.12 1.77 0.93
8 298.1 -176.9 -370.3 120.5
14 337.5 -186.3 -400.2 149.7
20 -0.8 0.07 0.21 -0.53
Figures 8 and 7 contain histograms of the cFGLS estimators
obtained using the bootstrapped average and dynamic data,
respectively. In each of these histograms, we also indicate
the original cFGLS11 (indicated in red), bagging (indicated in
blue), bumping (indicated in green), and boosting (indicated
in orange) estimators with dashed vertical lines.
The histogram in Figure 8 contains the cFGLS estimators
for occupant 2. This histogram is representative of the other
occupants for the average data set. We see that the original
cFGLS, bagging, bumping, and boosting estimators each show
some amount of bias. This is largely due to the fact that the
average data set has a small sample size.
On the other hand, in Figure 7a we show the histogram of
cFGLS estimators for occupant 2 produced via bootstrapped
dynamic data and we can see that the original cFGLS estimator
(vertical red line) is nearly unbiased, indicated by the approx-
imate Gaussian distribution around the cFGLS estimate. This
is generally true for the occupants with the most variation and
frequency in their voting record. However, bagging, bumping,
and boosting produce estimates that are slightly biased in
11This is the cFGLS estimator produced using the original average and
dynamic data sets and not the bootstrapped data sets.
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Fig. 7. The histograms depict the estimates generated with the wild bootstrapping technique using the dynamic data set for (a) player 2 and (b) player 8.
The vertical lines mark the value of the cFGLS (red), bumping (green), bagging (blue), and boosting (orange) estimators. The histogram for player 2 is
approximately normally distributed around the initial cFGLS estimator, indicating that it is unbiased. On the other hand, this is not the case for player 8. Thus
its cFGLS estimator is biased. Overall, the majority of the proposed ensemble methods result in a significant reduction in variance in exchange for an small
increase in bias and greater forecasting accuracy. In our other work [43], we develop a hierarchical mixture model that considers both bias and variance.
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Fig. 8. The histogram depicts estimator values for player 2 using the wild
bootstrapping technique using the average data set. The vertical lines mark the
value of the cFGLS (red), bumping (green), bagging (blue), and boosting
(orange) estimators. We remark that the estimators are all biased. This is
expected due to limited sample size of the average data set. Thus, the average
data set cannot be used for optimizing the bias-variance tradeoff.
exchange for a reduction in estimator variance—see (33).
Occupant 2 is representative of players which prefer to
focus on lighting satisfaction as opposed to winning whereas
occupant 8 is representative of players which prefer winning
to lighting satisfaction. While a very active voter, frequently
participating in the game, occupant 8’s voting record has little
variation (the majority of the time x8 = 0). Figure 7b contains
the cFGLS estimators for occupant 8 and we see that each
of the estimators are slightly biased. Again, these estimators
introduce bias in exchange for a reduction in variance.
D. Forecasting via Approximated Correlated Game
We now show the results for the correlated utility learning
method. Let us use the notation
gˆi(xi, x−i; {θˆj}j∈Ki) =
∑
j∈Kizi,jσi,jψi(xi, x−i)
+ σi,j θˆjφi(xi, x−i) (35)
where recall that Ki ⊂ I is the index set for the players
whose parameters are used to modify player i’s utility function
in generating the correlated game and θˆj is the estimated
parameter from the utility learning methods including cOLS,
cFGLS, bagging, bumping, and boosting. We use the notation
gˆi(·; {θˆj}j∈Ki}) as short-hand.
In Table IV, we show a subset of the estimated covariance
matrices obtained using the dynamic and average data sets.
Using these values, we construct the following correlated
game. Player 2’s utility function is modified by player 20’s:
gˆ2(x2, x−2;K2) = (z2,2σ2,2 + z2,20σ2,20)ψ2(x2, x−2)
+ (σ2,2θˆ2 + σ2,20θˆ20)φ2(x2, x−2) (36)
where K2 = {2, 20}. Player 2 and 20 are passive players
in that their votes tend to be strongly related to their lighting
satisfaction as opposed to increasing their chances of winning.
They are also very active players, having a lot of variation in
their voting record. These two players are positively correlated
with one another (see the red cells in Table IV).
On the other hand, player 8 and 14 are aggressive players
in that their votes tend to be much lower indicating a greater
desire to win points. These players are also positively corre-
lated (see the green cell’s in Table IV). With this in mind, we
modify player 8’s utility function by player 14’s:
gˆ8(x8, x−8;K8) = (z8,8σ8,8 + z8,14σ8,14)ψ8(x8, x−8)
+ (σ8,8θˆ8 + σ8,14θˆ20)φ8(x8, x−8) (37)
where K8 = {8, 14}.
Player 14 is also negatively correlated with player 2. Hence,
player 14’s utility function is modified by player 2’s and 8’s
utilities. That is, with K14 = {2, 8, 14}, we have
gˆ14(x14, x−14;K14) =
∑
i∈K14(z14,iσ14,iψ14(x14, x−14)
+ σ14,iθˆiφ14(x14, x−14)) (38)
All the other players’ utilities in the correlated game re-
main unchanged; that is, they are taken to be gˆi = fˆi,
i ∈ I/{2, 8, 14}.
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE MOST ACTIVE PLAYERS USING THE (a) DYNAMIC DATA SET AND (b) AVERAGE DATA SET. THE COLORED
COLUMN-ROW PAIRS INDICATE THE AGENTS WHOSE UTILITIES WE MODIFY TO CREATE THE CORRELATED GAME; THE COLUMN INDICATES THE
AGENT(S) WHOSE ESTIMATED PARAMETER IS USED TO MODIFY THE ROW AGENT’S UTILITY. IN PARTICULAR, AGENT 2’S UTILITY FUNCTION IS
MODIFIED BY BY AGENT 20’S ESTIMATED PARAMETER (RED), AGENT 8’S UTILITY FUNCTION IS MODIFIED BY AGENT 14’S ESTIMATED PARAMETER
(GREEN), AND AGENT 14’S UTILITY FUNCTION IS MODIFIED BY AGENT 2’S AND AGENT 8’S ESTIMATED PARAMETER (BLUE). NOTE THAT AGENTS 2
AND 14 ARE ANTI-CORRELATED, WHERE AGENTS 8 AND 14 (RESP. AGENTS 2 AND 20) ARE POSITIVELY CORRELATED. AGENTS 2 AND 20 ARE PASSIVE
PLAYERS, VOTING MORE FOR COMFORT THAN WINNING, WHERE AGENTS 8 AND 14 VOTE MORE AGGRESSIVELY.
Id
2
6
8
14
20
2 6 8 14 20
0.086 0.080 -0.190 -0.248 0.059
0.080 7.56 8.64 9.02 0.028
-0.190 8.64 170.98 44.29 -0.337
-0.248 9.02 44.29 87.34 -0.312
0.059 0.028 -0.337 -0.312 0.063
(a) Average Data
Id
2
6
8
14
20
2 6 8 14 20
0.044 0.059 -2.805 -5.191 0.031
0.059 7.836 -16.82 0.844 -0.016
-2.805 -16.82 6.43×104 4.28×104 -7.60
-5.191 0.844 4.28×104 8.84×104 -12.59
0.031 -0.016 -7.60 -12.59 0.073
(b) Dynamic Data
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Fig. 9. Forecasting results for the correlated game using (a) dynamic data and (b) averaged data for the default lighting setting 20: For the dynamic data,
the x–axis values indicate the index of when a choice was made by one or more of the occupants (i.e. when the implemented lighting setting is changed);
the time from one index to the next may be several minutes to hours depending on the activity of the occupants. For the averaged data, the x–axis values
are dates (month and day). The ground truth of the average of the lighting votes is depicted by the blue dots; the forecast for cOLS is depicted in black;
the forecast for correlated cOLS is depicted in purple; the forecast for correlated bagging is depicted in gray; the forecast for correlated bumping is depicted
in green; the forecast for correlated boosting is depicted in gold. The forecast for the robust utility learning methods is approximately near the ground truth
for both data sets while the cOLS estimates produce Nash equilibria with a large error. However, the correlated cOLS forecast significantly improves on the
cOLS forecast.
TABLE V
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR (RMSE), MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR (MAE) AND
MEAN ABSOLUTE SCALED ERROR (MASE) OF FORECASTING USING THE
ESTIMATED CORRELATED UTILITY FUNCTIONS. WE ESTIMATED CORRELATED
UTILITY FUNCTIONS gˆi(·; {θj}j∈Ki ) USING PARAMETERS FROM THE BAGGING,
BUMPING, BOOSTING, AND COLS METHODS FOR BOTH DATA SETS IN DEFAULT
LIGHTING SETTING 20.
Dynamic, gˆi bagging boosting bumping cOLS
RMSE 6.38 9.58 8.82 8.44
MAE 4.59 6.81 5.52 5.58
MASE 1.84 2.72 2.21 2.23
Averaged, gˆi bagging boosting bumping cOLS
RMSE 2.18 1.63 2.36 2.83
MAE 1.75 1.27 1.92 2.30
MASE 0.78 0.56 0.86 1.03
These player combinations were selected since, through
the correlated game, we aim to improve our estimators by
leveraging correlations between players. In particular, the
goal is to utilize information learned from players with the
most variation in their votes in improving the estimates of
players who consistently vote the same value or have a limited
participation record.
In Table V, we present the RMSE, MAE, and MASE for
the estimated correlated game {gˆi(·; {θˆj}j∈Ki)}i∈I where the
θˆj’s are taken to be the cOLS, bagging, boosting, and bumping
estimators. Comparing these results to those in Table II, we
see that correlated estimation schemes applied to the dynamic
data set reduce the estimation error for almost every method.
Moreover, correlated bagging outperforms bagging, the best
performing ensemble method, by all three metrics. For the
average data set, correlated boosting outperforms the best
performing ensemble method, boosting, again by all three
metrics.
In Figure 9, we show the forecast produced by the correlated
utility learning method using the cOLS, bagging, bumping, and
boosting estimators and the ground truth test data. Figure 9a
and 9b are the forecasts for the dynamic and average data sets,
respectively.
What is perhaps most interesting is that, for both data
sets, the correlated cOLS results improve the forecasting error
as compared to cOLS and the results are not significantly
different than the other ensemble methods. This can be seen
in Table V and Figure 9. The importance of this finding is
that correlated cOLS has the potential to be integrated into
an online algorithm. The classical cOLS can be performed
online and is, thus, amenable to an online incentive design
framework [3], [8]. However, as we have seen, the ensem-
ble methods significantly outperform cOLS. Determining the
estimated covariance matrix requires solving a generalized
least squares (GLS) and noise covariance estimation prob-
lem [44]. Given that the estimated correlated game using cOLS
parameters provides nearly the same estimation error as the
ensemble methods, these methods can be adapted to estimate
the correlated game parameters and then introduced into an
adaptive incentive design framework. We are currently explor-
ing this extension as the ultimate objective is to utilize the
learned utilities in an incentive design framework, preferably
one that can be executed in an adaptive/online manner. This
will support a more robust online utility learning and incentive
design algorithm.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We presented a general framework for robust utility learning
using a heteroskedastic inference adaptation to cGLS and we
leveraged learned correlations between players in constructing
a correlated utility learning framework that matches the robust
utility learning errors while also being amenable to online
implementation. The latter is important for integrating the
proposed utility learning techniques with adaptive control or
online incentive design. For example, it has been shown that
static programs for encouraging energy efficiency are subject
to the rebound effect in which participants often return to less
efficient behavior after some time [45], [46]. By integrating
our utility learning framework with incentive design, we
will be able to create an adaptive model that learns how
users’ preferences change over time and thus, generate the
appropriate incentives to ensure active participation.
To demonstrate the utility learning methods, we applied
them to data collected from a smart building social game
we conducted where occupants vote for shared resources
and participate in a lottery. We were able to estimate nearly
unbiased estimators for several agent profiles and significantly
reduce the forecasting error as compared to cOLS. The robust
utility learning framework enables us to effectively close
the loop around smart building occupants by providing the
foundation for learning a decision-making model that can be
integrated into the incentive or control design process. While
we apply the method to smart building social game data, it
can be applied more generally to scenarios with the task of
inverse modeling of competitive agents and provides a useful
tool for many smart infrastructure applications where learning
decision–making behavior is crucial.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the assumptions hold. The
constraints for each player do not depend on other players’
choice variables. We can hold x∗−i fixed and apply Propo-
sition 3.3.2 [11] to the i-th player’s optimization problem
max
{
fi(xi, x
∗
−i) | xi ∈ Ci
}
. Since each fi is concave and
each Ci is a convex set, x∗i is a global optimum of the i-th
player’s optimization problem under the assumptions. Since
this is true for each of the i ∈ {1, . . . , n} players, x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium.
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